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Article 5

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
WHAT CONSTrTUTES PUNISHMENT?

I. Introduction
Be one lawyer or layman, the initial connotation derived when the word
"punishment" is mentioned is that of a consequence resulting from an infraction
of the criminal law. Indeed, in evidencing the lawyer's view Black's Law Dictionary' refers to the early Supreme Court decision in Cummings v. Missouri2 and
defines "punishment" as, "Any pain, penalty, suffering, or confinement inflicted
upon a person by the authority of the law and the judgment and sentence of a
court, for some crime or offense committed by him, or for his omission of a duty
enjoined by law." For the layman, Webster's New InternationalDictionary3 defines
the word as, "A penalty inflicted by a court of justice on a convicted offender
as a just retribution, and incidentally for reformation and prevention ...
"
Because of the criminal law aspects generally attributed to punishment, the
person upon whom it is inflicted in criminal proceedings is surrounded by a gamut
of constitutional safeguards provided by the fifth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments. However, in many instances it has been found that courts have denied
defendants the usual constitutional protections involved in criminal cases, while
at the same time visiting upon them exactions which in reality amount to punishment, although not always denominating them as such. This has been consistently
achieved through what appears to be no more than semantic gymnastics or word
play, as well as through the flat declaration that the proceedings in question are not
criminal in nature, regardless of positive, convincing evidence to the contrary.
It is the purpose of this note to indicate the more notable areas in which such
cases lie.
II. Due Process of Law
"No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." So states the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution in making the due process requirement applicable to the federal courts.
The concept is of course a fundamental one in the American jurisprudential system,
and is intended to protect the individual against the arbitrary exercise of governmental 5power and to secure equal protection of the law to all.4 Fair play is its very
essence.
The command embodied in the fourteenth amendment that the states shall
afford due process to everyone is worded in a fashion similar to that of its counterpart in the fifth amendment. It has been said that the clause's purpose is not to
protect an accused against a proper conviction, but rather to guard him from an
unfair one. 6 Thus, fair play as the essence of due process is recognized in the
fourteenth amendment with a force equal to its recognition as such in the fifth.
Rather than creating new rights in the individual, the amendment shelters him
from deprivation by the states of his fundamental or natural rights, such as those
to life or liberty.7
In the area of punishment, the eighth amendment, which prohibits cruel and
unusual punishments, stands in close conjunction with the due process requirement in
guaranteeing that punishment will not be inflicted without the strict standards of
the Constitution having first been met. It is believed that the concept of punish1

4th ed. 1951.

4

La Porte v. Bitker, 55 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 145 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1944).

2 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
3 2d ed. 1959.
5 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 852 (1954).
6 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 784 (1947).
7 Screws v. United States, 140 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 325
U.S. 91 (1945).
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ment comes too close to seriously damaging the dignity of man to be haphazardly
applied.
Assuming that due process of law is a cherished institution that ought to be
preserved and strengthened, there must then be certain policy reasons which justify
nonadherence to the constitutional mandate that it be granted indiscriminately
to every person. The initial area to be explored in this regard is that of proceedings
in the juvenile courts.
III. Juvenile Court Proceedings
Nearly every jurisdiction in this country, if not all, has a body of statutory
law pertaining to the handling of juvenile offenders. Before such juvenile court
acts were passed in the several jurisdictions, it was well established that minors
were entitled to the same constitutional safeguards as adults charged with crime."
But since the advent of these enactments, the juvenile has been increasingly denied
those time-honored protections which would fully be his but for his age.
The two reasons most often advanced as to why the various constitutional
safeguards need not be afforded in juvenile court proceedings are that the proceeding is not criminal, and that the disposition of the child is not punishment, but is
rather for his "protection." 9 It is submitted that in many instances this is nothing
more than sophistry. Typical of the general outlook is this recent statement by a
Pennsylvania court:
The Juvenile Court proceedings are not criminal in nature but constitute
merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the treatment, reformation,
and rehabilitation of the minor child, and, therefore many of the
constitutional guarantees afforded to a criminal defendant are not
available and not necessary.' 0

Because of the aforementioned reasons, such familiar constitutional rights as
those to jury trial," counsel,' 2 a speedy and public trial,"1 and information as to
the nature and cause of the accusation 4 have been withheld from the juvenile
offender. Such an attitude toward the plight of wayward youth is definitely not
a thing of the past; it prevails even today. For example, in Cope v. Campbell,5
decided in February of this year, an Ohio juvenile court found a seventeen-yearold to be delinquent because he committed an act of malicious entry, an offense
which is a felony if committed by an adult. The court did not furnish the boy

with counsel, nor did it advise him of his constitutional rights prior to the ex parte
hearing. -The child, who had a record of delinquency, was sent to the Ohio state
8 E.g., People ex tel. O'Connell v.Turner, 55 Ill.
280 (1870); Commonwealth v.Horregan, 127 Mass. 450 (1879); State ex tel. Cunningham v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885).
9 Pee v.United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C.Cir. 1959); Shioutakon v.District of Columbia 236 F.2d 666 (D.C.Cir. 1956); Rule v. Geddes, 23 App. D.C. 31 (1904); Application o? Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1957); People v. Dotson, 46 Cal.2d 891, 299
P.2d 875 (1956); In re Dargo, 86 Cal.App.2d 114, 194 P.2d 34 (1948); Ex parte Naccarat,
328 Mo. 722, 41 S.W.2d 176 (1931); Roberts v.State, 82 Neb. 651, 118 N.W.574 (1908);
Petition of Morin, 95 N.H. 518, 68 A.2d 668 (1949); State v. Goldberg, 124 N.J.L. 272,
11 A.2d 299 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 125 N.J.L. 501, 17 A.2d 173 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940); Cope
v. Campbell, 175 Ohio St. 475 (1964); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955); Commonwealth v. Henig, 200 Pa. Super. 614, 189 A.2d
894 (1963); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944); In re Gomez, 113
Vt. 224, 32 A.2d 138 (1943). See also Antieau, ConstitutionalRights in Juvenile Courts, 46
CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961) for a review of the cases both affording and denying the juvenile

the several constitutional safeguards.

10 Commonwealth v. Henig, 200 Pa. Super. 614, 189 A.2d 894, 896 (1963).
11 State v. Heath, 352 Mo. 1147, 181 S.W.2d 517 (1944).
12 People v. Dotson, 46 Ca.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956); Cope v. Campbell, 175 Ohio
St. 475 (1964).
13 In re Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103 A.2d 460 (1954); Dendy v.Wilson, 142 Tex.
460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944). But ithas been held that a proceeding injuvenile court does
not even amount to a "trial."
Commonwealth v.Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 At. 198 (1905).
14 Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 At. 678 (1923).
15 175 Ohio St. 475 (1964).
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reformatory pursuant to statute. His petition for habeas corpus was denied by the
Supreme Court of Ohio, which held that since juvenile court proceedings are
civil rather than criminal in nature, the appellant was never prosecuted, indicted,
convicted, or sentenced, and hence there was no violation of either the federal
or state constitutions because of the failure to supply an attorney in the juvenile
court. The court went on to remark that the statute in question impliedly provides
for the protection of the child, not for his punishment. The legislature "clearly"
did not intend to place any sort of stigma upon the youth; rather, it intended to
provide for his correction and rehabilitation. The court either overlooked or did
not care to comment upon the cold, hard fact that this boy was nevertheless still
incarcerated and deprived of his freedom with its stamp of approval, regardless
of the good intentions of the state's lawmakers.
Similar reasoning was employed in the recent case of People v. Dotson. 6 In
that decision the juvenile was charged with felony-murder in the superior court.
The proceeding was suspended in that tribunal while the juvenile court determined
that the youth was not a fit subject over which it would exercise jurisdiction. He
was not represented by counsel before the juvenile court. The Supreme Court of
California, in holding that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal ones,
although the charge is, said:
While such minors are as much entitled to constitutional guarantees
as when subjected to criminal proceedings, . . . nevertheless, because
of the nature of the proceedings, the denial of those requirements which
have been recognized as elements of a fair trial does not necessarily deprive one of due process of law in Juvenile Court proceedings. The fact
that a minor is not represented by counsel need not be a denial of due
process in the Juvenile Court.' 7

Fortunately, not all courts agree. Some have taken a realistic approach to
the entire situation, as did the one in In re Contreras:'8
While the juvenile court law provides that adjudication of a minor to
be a ward of the court shall not be deemed to be a conviction of crime,
nevertheless, for all practical purposes, this is a legal fiction, presenting a
challenge to credulity and doing violence to reason. Courts cannot and
will not shut their eyes and ears to everyday contemporary happenings.
It is common knowledge that such an adjudication when based upon
a charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon
the character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such
minor. Let him attempt to enter the armed services of his country or
obtain a position of honor and trust and he is immediately confrontdd
with his juvenile court record. 19 And further, as in this case, the minor
is taken from his family, deprived of his liberty and confined in a state
institution. True, the design of the Juvenile Court Act is intended to
be salutary, and every effort should be made to further its legitimate
purpose, but never should it be made an instrument for the denial to
a minor of a constitutional right or of a guarantee afforded by law
to an adult. Regardless of the provisions of section 736 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code, the fact remains that the minor herein was taken
from the custody of his parents, deprived of his liberty and ordered confined in a state institution ...
Surely, a minor charged in the juvenile court with acts denounced
by law as a felony does not have lesser constitutional statutory rights
or guaranties than are afforded an adult under similar circumstances in
the superior court. The record herein is barren of sufficient legal evidence to establish even reasonable or probable cause of the minor's guilt,
and he should have been returned to his family, . . . A charge against
a minor resulting in his removal from the custody of his parents cannot
be regarded lightly, and such action is not justified unless facts be shown
16

46 Cal.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956).

17
18

46 Cal.2d 891, 299 P.2d 875, 877 (1956).
109 Cal.App.2d 787, 241 P.2d 631, 633-34 (1952).

19 In some states, e.g., Wisconsin, statutes have been enacted which prohibit the admission of juvenile proceedings into evidence in other courts of the state. This is based

upon a strong social policy of protecting the child. Smith v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 20 Wis.
2d 592, 123 N.W.2d 496 (1963) (Footnote added.)
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by evidence, the verity of which has been carefully and legally tested. We
'find nothing in the juvenile court law that attempts to impose any unlawful restraint upon personal liberty. In practically all of the cases
affecting juvenile court proceedings that have come to our attention,
the minor has admitted the charge lodged against him and the only
problem presented to the court was how to best guide and control the
minor with a view to his rehabilitation and further development. In
the case at bar however, the minor emphatically and at all times denied
his alleged delinquency. Under such circumstances his liberty should not
be taken from him until his guilt of the charges lodged against him
was established by legal evidence. That however praiseworthy, according
to the viewpoint of the individual, may be the motives of the juvenile
court, that tribunal may not impinge upon the legal rights of one
brought before it. . . . In the final analysis the juvenile court-is a judicial
institution.

As the statement from the Contreras opinion indicates, the simple fact of the
matter is that once a juvenile obtains a record, it manages to subsequently follow
him around, irrespective of the state's noble efforts as parens patriae to shield the
child from its odious mark. Evidencing this is People v. Smallwood,20 in which it
was held proper to ask a question pertaining to previous difficulties with juvenile
authorities as a means of impeaching the credibility of an ex-juvenile delinquent
who was the prosecuting witness in a statutory rape case.
Some juvenile court acts are patently Janus-faced in their wording. An
interesting example is an early enactment of the city of Detroit, which provided
that proceedings thereunder were not to be deemed criminal, while at the same
time stipulating that if a child was adjudged to be a delinquent, the court could,
inter alia, impose a fine upon him not exceeding twenty-five dollars. When the
statute came under judicial scrutiny, the Supreme Court of Michigan declared it
to be violative of the state constitution. The authority to fine a juvenile conferred
by the act amounted to a giving of the power to punish him for delinquency,
thereby making the proceeding under the law in effect a criminal one. Since a
criminal proceeding was thus involved, the statute's provision for a six-man jury
in delinquency trials was held unconstitutional because of the requirement of a
jury of twelve in a criminal prosecution.21
Some state 22 and federal23 decisions have lately recognized that although
juvenile court proceedings are not to be regarded as criminal in nature, still there
is a constitutional minimum standard of fundamental fairness towards the youthful
offender which must be observed. Such tribunals are not about to allow juveniles
to be stripped of all their rights because of an innocent-sounding label placed upon
the proceedings by a legislature. Nor do they seem disposed towards permitting
the laudable role of the government as parens patriae to provide a justification for
what would otherwise be sheer deprivation of constitutional protections. In In
the Matter of Cromwell,24 two fifteen-year-olds were found to be delinquent pursuant to statute because they participated in civil rights demonstrations. The court,
in noting that a minimum amount of fairness must be afforded juveniles, held that
the detention of the pair beyond the immediate need for their protection could not
be supported in view of the fact that the adults involved in the same demonstratiois were either dismissed or received only minimum fines.
The courts of the District of Columbia are noteworthy in having faced up
to the harsh realities of the situation and for having adopted what is submitted to
be the better approach. As far back as 1955, the district court there ruled that
despite the fact that the Juvenile Court of the District is not a criminal court, due
process demands that a child before it is entitled to be advised that he has the
20

306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303 (1943).

21

Robison v. Wayne Circuit Judges, 151 Mich. 315, 115 N.W. 682 (1908).

22

In the Matter of Cromwell, 232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963).

23
24

Application of Johnson, 178 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1957).
232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963).
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right to counsel where the act in question would be a crime if committed by an
adult, and even though the charge is denominated "juvenile delinquency" out of
charitable considerations for the child's welfare. 25 Remarking that the intent of
Congress in enacting the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act was to give
the juvenile safeguards in addition to those he already possessed instead of diminishing them, Judge Curran said:
If this deprivation [of constitutional rights] were extended to cover certain crimes committed by adults, it would be condemned by the Courts.
Yet by some sort of rationalization, under the guise of protective measures, we have reached a point where rights once held by a juvenile are
no longer his. Have we now progressed to a point where a child may
be incarcerated and deprived of his liberty during his minority by calling that which is a crime by some other name? . . . This Court stands
steadfast in the belief that the Federal Constitution, insofar as it is applicable "cannot be nullified by' 26a mere nomenclature, the evil or the
thing itself remaining the same.
A year later, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in another
case agreed, in the course of holding that advising a juvenile of his right to the
assistance of an attorney is not incompatible with the twin objectives of dealing

with children in an informal manner
and encouraging dispositions looking toward
27
treatment rather than punishment.

As far as the District of Columbia courts are concerned, the test to be applied
in determining if constitutional rights surround the juvenile is whether there is a

potential loss of liberty involved because the final action of the court may result
m taking from him his freedom. 28 It is therefore immaterial whether the juvenile
court is a criminal court or a true civil forum, or whether the resulting confinement is in a jail, penitentiary, reformatory, training school, or other institution.
In accord with United States v. Dickerson is Trimble v. Stone.29 Simply because
District of Columbia Juvenile Court proceedings are technically civil rather than
criminal does not necessarily mean that constitutional protections are inapplicable.
"Basic human rights do not depend on nomenclature."3 0 Judge Holtzoff further
observed:
To say that a boy who is sent to a training school or a reform school
by the Government in a paternalistic spirit, is not being punished, while
a person who is committed to a reformatory or penitentiary is there
for punishment, does not bear the aspect of reality. All incarceration consequent on an infraction of the law combines deterrence, punishment,
and treatment for rehabilitation in varying degrees ....
The ultimate
test is not whether the proceedings are denominated criminal or civil,
but what their outcome may be. If as a result of an infraction of law,
the proceedings may result in depriving a person of his liberty, the
protection of the Bill of Rights is applicable.3 '

Thus the right to bail was deemed applicable in proceedings before the juvenile
5
court.

25 In re Poff, 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
26 Id. at 226.
27 Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1956): "The 'right
to be heard' when personal liberty is at stake requires the effective assistance of counsel in a
juvenile court quite as much as it does in a criminal court."
28 United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899 (D.D.C. 1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d 487
(D.C. Cir. 1959). The case concerned a juvenile arrested for robbery, and the question
before the District Court was whether the double jeopardy provision of the federal constitution was applicable in juvenile court proceedings. That court held that it was. In reversing, the Court of Appeals expressly stated that it was not deciding that jeopardy could
never attach to dispositions of the juvenile court. So, the test enunciated by the lower court
regarding possible loss of liberty was not robbed of its vitality by the reversal.
29 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). See also In the Matter of Alexander, 152 Cal.
App. 2d 458, 313 P.2d 182 (1957).
30 Id. at 485.
31 Id. at 486. (Emphasis added.)
32 Accord, State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So. 2d 211 (1943); Ex parte Osborne, 127
Tex. Crim. 136, 75 S.W.2d 265 (1934).
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The argument that the disposition of the juvenile is not punishment is in
many instances supposedly buttressed by the statement that the institution to which
he is sent is on a level superior to that occupied by the ordinary penitentiary or
common jail. The following is representative:
"Our industrial school is not a place of punishment" nor is it in any
sense a prison, no more so than our public schools upon which the law
requires and enforces an attendance. It is a place of education, reformation, refinement, and culture. It is a beneficent provision for the uplift
of boys. .

.

. The action of the court in sending them to the school is

to avoid a "conviction" and change the prospective punishment into a
blessing.3 3

Would the boys agree? Most probably not. How this attitude is correct is not
readily apparent. But it still survives, and has led to absurd results such as the
one in Leonard v. Licker,3 4 in which the court acknowledged that the Ohio reformatory was a prison for felons. Nevertheless, the court approved of committing delinquent children thereto after they had performed acts which would be felonies if
done by adults, because as to the delinquents, the place was only a reformatory
or school, as its name implied. The obvious fact that mere youths were being
placed in close proximity with hardened criminals was neatly avoided. However,
there have been those who view the situation realistically:
It cannot be said truthfully that the Industrial Training School in this
state is not a penal institute. It is as much a penal institution as the
modern, well-regulated, humanely managed penitentiary. Its inmates
are restrained of their liberty of action, notwithstanding the purpose of
the law is to reform and educate them. That also is true in a large measure
of all penal institutions, both state and federal. 35

All of the foregoing is designed to demonstrate that in the sphere of the juvenile
court, judges every day are mechanically applying timeworn stock reasons why
the youthful offenders before them are not to be given the same package of constitutional protections that the law jealously demands be afforded to adults charged
with crime. None of these standard arguments appears to justify the deprivation
of such important rights, and merely because they have somehow withstood the
test of time is, by itself, surely no sufficient reason for their continuance. On the
contrary, all of them in one way or another fly in the face of reality. It is felt that
courts such as the one in In re Contreras" and those in the District of Columbia
have reached the core of the matter and have acted accordingly to obtain for the
juvenile the complete set of constitutional safeguards. It would do the other courts
well to heed the dissenting words of Justice Musmanno of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania before deciding to implement the old reasoning again in the future:
How is the presence or absence of guilt to be ascertained? In all civilized
countries it is determined by following a certain organized procedure
which assures to the accused an opportunity to assert his innocence,
face his accusers, call witnesses in his behalf, obtain the services of counsel
and be adjudged by an impartial tribunal. Nowhere in the world are the
rights of an accused so jealously guarded as in the United States. The
case before us, however, presents an amazing paradox in jurisprudence.
This Court says, through a majority of the Justices, that certain constitutional and legal guarantees such as immunity against self-incrimination, prohibition of hearsay, interdiction of ex parte and secret reports,
all so zealously upheld in decisions from Alabama to Wyoming, are to be
jettisoned in Pennsylvania when the person at the bar of justice is a
tender-aged boy or girl.
The Majority is of the impression that the adjudication of delinquency of a minor is not a very serious matter because "No suggestion
or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a

33 Roberts v. State, 82 Neb. 651, 118 N.W. 574, 576 (1908). See also Rule v. Geddes,
23 App. D.C. 31 (1904); State ex rel. Caillouet v. Marmouget, 111 La. 225, 35 So. 529
(1903); Petition of Morin, 95 N.H. 518, 68 A.2d 668 (1949).
34 3 Ohio App.377 (1914).
35 Bryant v.Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184, 194 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
36 Supra note 18.
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Juvenile Court." . . . To say that a graduate of a reform school is not
to be "deemed a criminal" is very praiseworthy but this placid bromide
commands no authority in the fiercely competitive fields of every-day
modem life.
A most disturbing fallacy abides in the notion that a Juvenile Court
record does its owner no harm. The grim truth is that a Juvenile Court
record is a lengthening chain that its riveted possessor will drag after
him through childhood, youthhood, adulthood and middle age...
It is equally a delusion to say that a Juvenile Court record does not
handicap because it cannot be used against the minor in any court. In
point of fact it will be a witness against him in the court of business
and commerce, it will be a bar sinister to him in the court of society where
the penalties inflicted for deviation from conventional codes can be as
ruinous as those imposed in any criminal court, it will be a sword of
Damocles hanging over his head in public life, it will be a weapon to
hold him at bay as he seeks respectable and honorable employment.3 7
IV. Deportation
Much along the same lines as the rationale employed to deny the penal character
of juvenile court dispositions is that utilized to disregard deportation as a form
of punishment. Over and over, deportation has been held not to be punishment;
the proceedings in which deportation is imposed are not criminal ones.38 It is
again opined that this is a gross fiction generated by semantic confusion plus a
tendency towards ignoring realities.3 9 Some courts have approximated viewing
the actualities through a recognition that deportation may be burdensome and
severe, yet they have stubbornly clung to the old way by ruling that it is still not
punishment in the legal sense. 40
Evidently, the courts find it easier to rely upon such reasoning where the
person involved is an alien residing in this country. Although it has been held
that an alien is a "person," and as such is entitled to the same protection for his
life, liberty, and property under the due process clause as is a citizen, 4 ' it is fairly
42
obvious that the due process he does receive is often only a minimal amount.
For example, in Costanzo v. Tihlinghast,43 petitioner was a resident alien who
was ordered deported to Italy. This order was held not to be a punishment within
the meaning of the prohibition of the eighth amendment; it was not the imposition
of a penalty upon the alien for any crime. Hence, a hearing upon deportation is
not a trial in a criminal case, and therefore the rules of evidence which must be
applied in such trials need not be followed. And in Bhagat Singh v. McGrath.,"
because deportation proceedings were deemed civil rather than criminal in nature,
37 In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, 528-29 (1954) (dissenting opinion), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
38 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 936 (1952);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); United States
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404 (9th
Cir. 1955), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 350 U.S. 990 (1956); Quattrone v. Nicholls,
210 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954); Soewapadji v. Wixon, 157
F.2d 289 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 792 (1946); Bhagat Singh v. McGrath, 104
F.2d 122 (9th Jir. 1939); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 56 F.2d 566 (1st Cir.), aff'd, 287 U.S.
341 (1932); Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (Ist Cir. 1922); Fougherouse v. Brownell,
163 F. Supp. 580 (D. Ore. 1958).
39 Navasky, Deportation as Punishment, 27 U. KAN. CITY L. RIv. 213 (1959). The
argument that deportation is punishment has been lightly dismissed by the statement that
deportation is simply the refusal by the government to harbor those whom it does not want.
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
40 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Quattrone v. Nicholls, 210 F.2d 513 (ist Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954).
41 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 852 (1954). Accord,
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
42 Although it is required to be exercised. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952);
Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1955).
43 56 F.2d 566 (1st Cir.), aff'd, 287 U.S. 341 (1932).
44 104 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1939).
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it was not required that the alien be confronted by the witnesses against him.
Consequently, such witnesses' testimony may be gathered by deposition, and the
alien's right to cross-examination is preserved by allowing him to do so through
deposition.
A particularly noteworthy illustration of the rule that deportation is not
punishment is found in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.45 The Government sought to deport appellant, a
legally resident alien, under the Alien Registration Act of 1940 for his activities
as a member of the Communist Party. Because his membership in the party
terminated prior to the enactment of the legislation, appellant argued that to deport
him would violate the constitutional clause condemning ex post facto laws. In
holding that it was constitutionally permissible for the United States to deport
Harisiades, the Court said that there was no retroactivity involved because the
1940 Act was actually a continuation of prior laws. Then the Court mentioned
that even if there was retroactivity, there would still be no infringement of the
ex post facto clause since its prohibition pertains only to criminal punishments,
among which deportation is not included. It is interesting to note that Justice
Jackson, the author of the majority opinion, observed that if it were not so wellsettled that deportation is not a criminal procedure, the principle might be debatable
as a proposition of first impression. Justices Douglas and Black, in dissent, equated
deportation with banishment, stating that the latter, as a practical matter, is
punishment, and that Congress was in effect ordering appellant deported for what
he once was.
Two cases which are outstanding examples of judicially approved human
sufferings are Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei" and United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.47 In the former, Mezei was an alien who had resided
in this country for some twenty-five years prior to making a journey to Europe in
1948, apparently to visit his dying mother in Rumania. Upon his return nearly two
years later, immigration officials denied him re-entry. Because the government had
information which supposedly dictated that Mezei was a security risk, and becau'se
this information was ostensibly of such a confidential nature that it was considered
inimical to the national interest to disclose it, even in camera, the attorney general
decided to make Mezei's exclusion permanent without granting him a hearing. He
attempted to obtain a haven in other countries, but none would accept him. The
result was that Mezei was confined at Ellis Island with no place to go. The
Supreme Court, five to four, ruled that Mezei could be so excluded without a
hearing, and that his detention on Ellis Island was not unlawful. Since Congress
had spoken on the matter, it was irrelevant to consider that Mezei's plight indeed
bore the mark of great hardship. The effect of the decision is that an alien in
circumstances such as these may be held in custody indefinitely without a hearing,
a ludicrous result to be sure.
Dissatisfied with its victory, and seemingly aware of its inequity, the Department of Justice appointed an ad hoc committee which permitted Mezei to know
and meet the evidence against him. Although the committee found that he was
a member of the Communist Party and as such legally excludable, it recommended
that he be allowed to return48 to his home in Buffalo. The Justice Department
followed the recommendation.
The Knauff case likewise involved the exclusion of an alien without a hearing.
Mrs. Knauff had been, prior to her marriage in Germany to a naturalized citizen
who had an honorable discharge from the army, employed by the United States
War Department in Germany. Her work for that agency was considered very
45
46
47

48

342 U.S. 580, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 936 (1952).
345 U.S. 206 (1953).
338 U.S. 537 (1950).
See 1 DAvis, ADMiNISTRATVE LAW TazATIS. § 7.15 (1958).
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satisfactory, and the commanding general at Frankfurt approved of the forthcoming union between her and Knauff. As a "war bride," she sought entry into
the United States to be naturalized and was refused without a hearing, solely
on the attorney general's finding that her admission would be prejudicial to American interests. In affirming the exclusion order, the Supreme Court based its decision upon the so-called "right-privilege" doctrine and held that since the admission
of aliens is a privilege only, one who seeks it has no claim of right in the matter
and may consequently be excluded without a hearing. In other words, since the
alien has no right to reside in this country, he has lost nothing by being refused
entry and is therefore not punished. "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." 49 The case
was not without a vigorous dissent, offered by three of the seven Justices, the following sample of which is an accurate indication of its tone:
Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in its

name. The menace to the security of this country, be it great as it may,

from this girl's admission is as nothing compared to the menace to free
institutions inherent in procedures of this pattern. In the name of security
the police state justifies its arbitrary oppressions on evidence that is
secret, because security might be prejudiced if it were brought to light in
hearings. The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent
to free men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer
undetected and uncorrected .... 50
Not all courts have been blind to the fact that deportation possesses penal

characteristics. The Supreme Court itself has recognized this, in Fong Haw Tan
v. Phelan.51 In that case the Court was faced with doubts concerning the interpretation to be given the Immigration Act of 1917, which, inter alia, provided that
a criminal alien could be deported. In adopting a narrow construction of the act,
the Court resolved the uncertainties in a manner favorable to the alien because
human freedom was involved, and because, "[D]eportation is a drastic measure
and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile, . . . It is the forfeiture for

misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty."' 52 And

in United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis,53 which involved the same section of the

1917 Act, Judge Learned Hand stated that, "[H]owever heinous [the alien's] crimes,
deportation is to him exile, a dreadful punishment, abandoned by the common
consent of all civilized peoples. Such, indeed, it would be to anyone ... .
From the aforementioned sampling of cases, it is believed that the average
person would readily conclude that deportation is surely punishment; the vivid
realities of the actual and possible consequences of that action certainly command
that it be regarded as such. To deny the alien, or anyone else for that matter,
due process of law, or to grant him only the barest quantity thereof merely because
there is at hand a semantic label of easy application is to do a grave injustice to
the one sought to be deported or excluded. Indeed, the effect of the sanction
imposed, rather than the reason for imposing it, must be the criterion employed
in order to decide whether the person is entitled to that bundle of safeguards
provided by our Constitution. Such distinctions as the one between "right" and
"privilege," for example, should have no place in this area as a basis for determining
whether such a drastic measure as deportation should be inflicted.
V. Forfeiture of Property
In the realm of forfeiture statutes, there is once more advanced the propo49 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
50- 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
51 333 U.S. 6 (1948).
52 Id. at 10. (Emphasis added.) The.Fifth Circuit is in accord. Wallis v. Tecchio, 65
F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1933).
53 13 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1926).
54 Id. at 630. (Emphasis added.)
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sition that the proceeding is not criminal, and that hence no punishment is inflicted
upon the individual. Consequently, the quantum of proof that is sufficient to
warrant a forfeiture is a preponderance of the evidence. 55 Moreover, the court
may in
56 such a case either direct a verdict for the government or enter a judgment
n.o.V.
57
Forfeiture actions are generally denominated as civil in rem proceedings.
Among the most popular of the various reasons assigned as to why a judgment of
forfeiture against property is not criminal in nature and therefore does not amount
to punishment is that the action is similar to the ancient law of deodand in that
it is a proceeding against the property rather than against its owner. In J. W.
Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 8 for instance, it was sought to condemn an automobile which had been used to conceal whiskey upon which a
federal tax had not been paid. The trial court instructed the jury to find the car
guilty. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed and held that in order
to prevent violations of the revenue laws, Congress intended to ascribe a particular
personality to the property in question. This sort of rationale seems patently fictitious; in fact, the Court even recognized the fiction, but neatly avoided the point
by saying: "But whether the reason for [the 1866 statute pursuant to which the
action was brought] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed59 in the punitive and
remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced."
Because it is the thing itself which is deemed to be the offender, it becomes
immaterial to consider whether its owner is himself guilty or innocent. Consequently, the item may still be confiscated although the owner had no complicity
in,or even knowledge of, the offense committed through the means supplied by
his property.8 0 When such an owner asserts his innocence before a court, its reply
is typically like this:
This is a proceeding in rem, against the car, in which the law ascribes
to it a power of complicity and guilt in the offense .... It is no longer
necessary to quote in support of this well established doctrine the common law as to deodands or the Mosaic
law as to the punishment inflicted upon an ox which gores a man.6 '

A recent state court decision 62 emphasized the general rule that acquittal in
a prior criminal prosecution is not a bar to a later forfeiture proceeding. In that
case the defendant was found not guilty of possessing alcoholic beverages, specifically
beer, in a dry area for the purposes of sale. The state then brought a forfeiture
action against the beer. Defendant's argument based upon the earlier acquittal
was unsuccessful because the forfeiture proceeding was held to be one against the
55 Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. One
1955 Mercury Sedan, 242 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1957); United States v. Twelve Ermine Skins,
78 F. Supp. 734 (D. Alaska 1948).
56 Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Twelve
Ermine Skins, 78 F. Supp. 734 (D. Alaska 1948).
57 Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Gable,
217 F. Supp. 82 (D. Conn. 1963); United States v. One 1960 Ford 4-Door Galaxie Sedan,
202 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) ; United States v. One 1948 Cadillac Convertible Coupe,
115 F. Supp. 723 (D.N.J. 1953); State v. Hondros, 100 S.C. 242, 84 S.E. 781 (1915);
State v. Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1963); State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301
S.W.2d 597 (1957).
58 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
59 Id. at 511.
60 Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Automobile, 256 F.2d
931 (5th Cir. 1958); Associates Investment Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.
1955); United States v. One 1951 Oldsmobile Sedan, 135 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Pa. 1955);
United States v. One 1948 Cadillac Convertible Coupe, 115 F. Supp. 723 (D.N.J. 1953);
United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe De Ville, 108 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1952);
United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe, 36 F. Supp. 788 (D. Mass. 1941); State v.
Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1963).
61 United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe, 36 F. Supp. 788, 790 (D. Mass. 1941).
62 State v. Benavidez, 365 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1963).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
beverage and not one against its owner or possessor. Thus, it is civil in nature,
and the owner or possessor of the contraband is not being criminally tried in the
forfeiture action. Hence, the prior adjudication of an issue in a criminal case is
not res judicata or estoppel by judgment to a subsequent civil action involving
the same factual issue, and the judgment of acquittal is not admissible as evidence
in the forfeiture case.
The federal courts likewise follow the principle that a previous acquittal in
a criminal case does not serve to bar the subsequent forfeiture action involving
63
the identical set of facts. In United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe De Ville,
for example, the owner of the automobile was charged with unlawful possession
of narcotics being transported in the car, but was acquitted. It was held that this
did not prevent the government from attempting to later confiscate the vehicle,
and it was ordered forfeited. The court said that the judgments were not inconsistent since the burden of proof in a criminal proceeding is greater than that
imposed in a forfeiture action. In the former, this burden rested upon the United
States, whereas in the latter it was upon the claimant after the government had
presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case establishing probable
cause for seizure of the property.
Where the owner is innocent, there of course could be no valid judgment of
forfeiture against his property if it was conceded that such forfeitures work a
penalty for the commission of crime. 4 Accordingly, the concept that forfeiture
is not punishment continues to survive. Such forfeitures have been justified at
the state level on the ground that it is a valid exercise of the sovereign's police power
to brand certain uses of property as being so undesirable that the owner surrenders
control thereof at his peril.65 It is therefore believed that by sanctioning such rules
the state is in a better position to effectively curb offenses like illegal transportation
of narcotics. Ideally, in the narcotics situation for example, it is thereby made
more difficult for those engaged in such traffic to borrow or rent vehicles with
which to carry on their illicit trade. The result of rigid applications of such rules
is unquestionably harsh6 6 insofar as the untainted owner is concerned, but drastic
7
measures are imperative in order that such harmful activities be suppressed.
Other methods have been utilized to work a forfeiture of an innocent owner's
property, and a recent federal case involving the unlawful transportation of narcotics
illustrates one. 68 There, under the federal statutory law on the subject, 69 a vehicle
used in the commission of one of the enumerated offenses is forfeitable unless the
user obtained possession thereof through a violation of a federal or state criminal
law. The court decided that the automobile in question did not come within the
statutory exception because the offender had his mother's permission to use it. She
was'its owner, and was not aware that her son was an addict, much less that he
would use the car to carry drugs. Nevertheless, since she gave her consent, the
son did not gain possession of the vehicle in violation of any criminal law, and thus
it was subject to forfeiture.
Another method through which forfeiture is successful is seen in the rule that
property obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure may still be con63 108 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
64 State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301 S.W.2d 597 (1957). See State v. Hondros,
100 S.C. 242, 84 S.E. 781 (1915).
65 Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926); State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301
S.W.2d 597 (1957).
66 United States v. Addison, 260 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. One
1957 Oldsmobile Automobile, 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1958); Commonwealth v. Certain Motor
Vehicle. 261 Mass. 504, 159 N.E. 613 (1928); State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301 S.W.2d
597 (1957).
67 State v. Richards, 157 Tex. 166, 301 S.W.2d 597 (1957). See United States v. One
1960 Ford 4-Door Galaxie Sedan, 202 F. Supp. 841 (E.D.Tenn. 1962).
68 United States v. One 1951 Oldsmobile Sedan, 135 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
69 53 Stat. 1291 (1939); 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-82 (1959).
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fiscated, even though it must be suppressed as evidence upon the criminal trial
because of the violation of the fourth amendment.70 The usual reason for this is
that since the statute declares that there are no property rights in contraband, the
claimant has no right to have it returned to him, regardless of the fact that the
Consitution commands that it be excluded as evidence in the criminal prosecution.7 1 At least two decisions have held that the unlawfulness of the search and
72
However, this minority position is
seizure bars the civil forfeiture proceeding.
73

no longer law in the Third Circuit.

Courts have occasionally stated that forfeiture of property is in the nature
of punishment. 74 Some have also said that forfeitures are not favored.7 5 And
at least two tribunals have declared that forfeiture is a variety of "civil punishment."76 In Commonwealth v. Certain Motor Vehicle,77 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that a forfeiture is a proceeding in rem to condemn
property illegally used. It is both criminal and punitive by its nature, but is also
more and different than simply punishment. Rather, it constitutes a legislative
method whereby illegalities are restrained and prevented. This is why forfeiture
may be had even though the owner is innocent of any wrongdoing. Furthermore,
the harshness of such a rule is justified by the necessity of combating injuries to
the public welfare.
It is again submitted that a recognition of realities dictates that despite all
pronouncements to the contrary, forfeiture be tabbed for what it assuredly is, i.e.,
a punishment. Unfortunately, cases like the ones mentioned in the preceding
paragraph are few. More courts should become disposed towards removing their
judicial blinders in this area, and accordingly should afford to the claimant of property sought to be condemned the same measure of rights and corresponding rules
which are granted in criminal matters.
VI. Miscellaneous
Various other activities have been categorized as nonpunishment, albeit on
their face they appear to be such. For instance, in State v. Smith,78 defendant was
convicted of slander and ordered to pay the costs of the action. A statute provided
that a defendant could be jailed until he paid such costs. Smith failed to do so
and was imprisoned for four months. The court held that the costs constituted
no part of his punishment.
Another illustration is found in the New York State Mental Hygiene Law,
which permits the initial confinement of an allegedly mentally ill person without
prior notice or hearing. The statute came under constitutional attack in In re
Coates,70 but was upheld on the ground that due process does not demand a hearing
70 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S.
699 (1948); United States v. Lee Wan Nam, 274 F.2d 863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
803 (1960); United States v. Bosch, 209 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mich. 1962); United States v.
One 1956 Ford 2-Door Sedan, 185 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. Ky. 1960).
71 United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
72 United States v. Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1950); United States v.

Loomis, 297 Fed. 359 (9th Cir. 1924). See Note, 38
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727 (1963).

73 See United States v. $1,058.00 In United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.
1963), overruling United, States v. Plymouth Coupe, 182 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1950).
74 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); United States v. One 1947 Oldsmobile
Sedan, 104 F. Supp. 159 (D.N.J. 1952); Commonwealth v. Certain Motor Vehicle, 261 Mass.
504, 159 N.E. 613 (1928).
75 United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219 (1939) ; United States v. American
Gas Screw Franz Joseph, 210 F. Supp. 581 (D. Alaska 1962); United States v. Twelve
Ermine Skins, 78 F. Supp. 734 (D. Alaska 1948).
76 Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959); United States v. One 1960
Ford 4-Door Galaxie Sedan, 202 F. Supp. 841, 843 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
77 261 Mass. 504, 159 N.E. 613 (1928).
78 196 N.C. 438, 146 S.E. 73 (1929).
79 9 N.Y.2d 242, 173 N.E.2d 797, appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 34 (1961).
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inthe situation where there is a temporary confinement, and where there is a need
for immediate action for the protection of society and for the welfare of the one
who is believed to be mentally ill. Saving the constitutionality of the section in
question was the provision for a complete rehearing and review ab initio. Furthermore, the allegedly mentally ill individual is not declared to be incompetent, but
is "merely" hospitalized in the first instance for not more than sixty days.8 0
As to licenses in general, it has been repeatedly held that the denial or revocation of them does not constitute punishment for an offense. 81 This is equally true
as to such ones as driver's8 2 and pharmacist's8 3 licenses. And finally, another theory
punishwhich has been employed to deny that the revocation of a license constitutes
84
ment is that the initial obtaining of one is a privilege, not a right.
VII. Conclusion
Whatever may be the justification for each of these approaches to the concept
of "punishment," the fact remains that it is only a semantic one in the vast majority
of cases, while in the rest it seems to be the result of an activity analogous to burying
one's head in the sand, ostrich-style. Punishment remains punishment, no matter
how diligently many of our courts attempt to eradicate this truism by cleverly substituting other reasoning, other rationales, other language. After having perused some
or all of the cases referred to herein, and after having read that the courts involved
have blatantly declared that the dispositions are just not punishment, would the
average layman, one untrained in the wiles and intricacies of the law, be disposed
to heartily concur in the light of his everyday experiences and knowledge? The
question answers itself. It can only be hoped that the judiciary will see fit to alter
the picture in such a fashion that the question need not be posed again.
Robert C. Findlay

80 Cf. In the Matter of Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871, 876 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd sub nom.
Overholser v. Williams, 252 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958), wherein the court said: "This court
is conscious . . . of the need for protection not only of the community but also of individuals
in need of psychiatric care and treatment. But these laudable purposes, under our form of
government, must be accomplished by procedures which are legal and not at the cost of
disregarding constitutional safeguards by deprivation of liberty without due process of law.

The mere fact that a commitment without due process is temporary and for the purpose of
psychiatric examination renders it no less unlawful." (Emphasis added.)
81 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
82 State ex rel. Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 273 N.W. 233 (1937).
83 Mandel v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 250 N.Y. 173, 164
N.E. 895 (1928).
84 Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455, 17 S.E.2d 393 (1941).

